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Abstract
The parameterisation of energy and climate policies often depends on
the technology, which is price-setting in electricity markets. We propose two
simple approaches to determine marginal technologies in electricity wholesale
from available data. Both approaches are complementary, computationally
lightweight, and do not require specific software. Identification is based
upon assumptions which are commonly used in more complex energy system
models and which vary according to the approach. We illustrate the relevance
of our approach for consistent policy parameterization with an example from
the compensation scheme for indirect emission costs from the EU Emissions
Trading Scheme (EU ETS). We find that the current policy design severely
overweighs CO2 emissions from lignite power plants in the CWE power
market.
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Keywords: Marginal technology, price formation, power market, indirect
cost compensation
1 Introduction
The impact of market-based energy and climate policies often depends on how they
affect energy prices. In the case of wholesale electricity prices, “marginal plants” of
electricity production are crucial for these price changes. Marginality describes - for
a specific plant and point in time - the situation in which all cheaper technologies
are already fully employed, and the plant in question is the least costly available
option needed to satisfy total demand. So, the price to get this plant running is
also the price that clears the market. Thus, marginal plants are usually said to be
price-setting. An assessment of energy policies that affect electricity prices therefore
crucially relies on information about marginality.
This article illustrates two simple approaches that allow to infer marginal tech-
nologies from observed market data in a transparent manner and with high timely
resolution. Such an approach can be particularly helpful whenever the parameters
for specific policies depend on assumptions of marginality and the determination of
these parameters requires a high level of transparency and reproducibility. Execut-
ing and comparing two separate procedures can help to check the robustness of the
results and the conclusions drawn.
The motivating example for this study is the compensation mechanism for indirect
CO2 costs from emissions trading in the European Union (EU) through the EU
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). Indirect CO2 cost arise from emission al-
lowance cost that are passed-through onto the price for electricity. Implementing a
compensation scheme of these cost for electricity consuming industries is optional
for EU Member States but the European Commission has issued binding guidelines
for Member States on a maximum level of firm’s compensation amount (EU Com-
mission 2012). This level depends among other things on region-specific emission
factors of power production, which are specified in the guidelines. Thus, the param-
eterization of these emission factors is crucial for the compensation level to be as
intendeded by the regulator. According to the European Commission, the current
emission factors are based on the weighted average CO2 intensities of electricity gen-
eration from fossil fuels in the respective regions. From an economic point of view,
the deficiency of such a policy specification is evident: In light of the marginality
argument, the average emission intensity of fossil fuel fired power production does
not inform about the actual CO2 cost contained in the power market clearing price
- even under complete cost-pass through of CO2 cost, which is likely the case in
electricity wholesale markets (Fabra and Reguant 2014; Hintermann 2016). When
the emission allowances cost for the production of electric power is passed on to
consumers, the electricity price change will depend on the emission intensity of the
marginal plant. The marginal plant in today’s electricity system will supposedly
be a fossil fuel fired plant but even this is not necessarily the case. Moreover, for
different hours and load levels different technologies with varying emission inten-
sities will be marginal. And the proportion in which these technologies will be
marginal is most likely not the same as the technology’s share in total generation of
fossil fuel based technologies. Consequently, a compensation scheme that is based
on emission factors ignoring these aspects will almost certainly over- or undercom-
pensate relative to the intended level of compensation for indirect CO2 costs. One
prominent case might be the inclusion of emissions from technologies that are not
marginal in a relevant number of hours. Lignite is typically the most emission inten-
sive fuel with specific CO2 emissions, i.e. emissions per electricity generated, clearly
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exceeding those of hard coal and natural gas. But lignite plants in Western Europe
also typically have lower specific fuel costs than natural gas or hard coal plants.
While it appears reasonable to assume hard coal and natural gas power plants to be
marginal technologies for most of the time, it is an open question whether lignite is
price-setting in a relevant number of hours. If lignite is not marginal for a significant
share of hours each year, including CO2 emissions from lignite in the calculation of
emission factors may overstate the actual impacts and consequently, the level of
indirect cost compensation.
This question is of particular importance for regions, in which lignite plants con-
stitute a significant share in fossil fuel fired electricity generation. Central Western
Europe (CWE), covering France, Germany, Austria and the Benelux countries, com-
prises countries with heterogeneous power systems. Power production in France and
Belgium is dominated by nuclear power; for Austria hydro power is the dominating
source. The bulk of all fossil fuel power plants in the CWE region are located in
Germany. And among all CWE countries, only Germany possesses active lignite
power stations. Still, CO2 emissions from lignite account for about 42 percent of
all CO2 emissions in electricity generation in the CWE region (period from 2005
to 2015, own calculation based on data from Eurostat and IPCC default emission
factors for fossil fuels. Note that lignite in Germany typically exhibits a higher
emission intensity than the IPCC factors, see Juhrich (2016)). Thus, the impact of
CO2 emissions from lignite on the average emission factor is non-negligible. But in
Germany, lignite plants are usually considered to be base load capacities, which -
by definition - are hardly price-setting.
All these arguments do not bite without a proper quantification. The most common
and widely accepted approach to study the power system and its interdependencies
are energy system models. These are typically numerically solvable optimisation
models which use various input data and technological information to represent the
system-wide provision of electric power in detail. Kallabis, Pape, and Weber (2016),
Hirth (2018), as well as Weigt and von Hirschhausen (2008) can serve as examples
for such an approach, comparing realised prices in the past with model results for
marginal cost. Admittedly, a strength of numerical energy system models is their
capability to produce forecasts and scenario analyses, see e.g. Weron (2014) for an
overview. A common point of critique brought forward is usually that such opti-
misation models are heavily driven by the underlying assumptions and that their
validity is hard to assess. For example, Knopf (2016) investigates the sensitivity with
respect to the selection of representative days. However, the majority of quantita-
tive research output depends on assumptions, no matter what specific methodology
is chosen. More important than dependence on assumptions is the transparency of
assumptions and their potential impact. An important stream of research is work-
ing on opening energy system models and their underlying data sources for public
scrutiny and collaborative work. Pfenninger et al. (2018) and Pfenninger et al.
(2017) provide an authorative account of these efforts. Open energy system mod-
elling is a great leap forward for transparency in policy consulting and policy design.
However, as powerful and transparent as these models are, their usage and scrutiny
will always be restricted to a group of experts with corresponding training. The aim
of our work is therefore not to rival with fully fledged energy system models, but
rather to provide an accessible alternative for the ex-post determination of marginal
technologies, which could be used to inform policy makers in their assessment of a
policy and its parameterisation. Our approach is computationally lightweight and
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does not depend on specific software. Given that the regulator decides on some
general assumptions, our approach could even serve for a dynamic and purely data
driven updating of policy parameters.
In this paper, we show how the fundamental idea of energy system models can be
used for a much simpler but not less plausible method to determine the marginal
technologies from observed data. We do so by taking a view from two different
angles: (1) looking on realised load and its relation to available capacity, (2) looking
on realised prices and how they compare to approximated marginal costs. The pre-
sented approaches evidently require a number of assumption, but not substantially
more or more critical ones than those required for more complex energy system
models. Moreover, these assumptions vary between our two approaches. Thus,
comparing results across approaches will help to check their plausibility. Finally,
the approaches do not require any optimisation algorithm. Indeed, all we do is to
summarise and interpret a number of descriptive statistics against the backdrop of
a set of transparently stated assumptions. Thus, our approach is easily reproducible
without the need of specific modelling software. The contribution of this paper is to
exemplify how such a simple calculation can be used to check the parameterisation
of a policy for consistency with the declared aim and against the backdrop of the
assumptions made. We do so for just a subcase of a specific technology - lignite
based power generation - in a specific market - the German and Austrian wholesale
electricity market - but comparable approaches are straightforward to implement
for similar questions in different circumstances.
Overall, we find that the share of hours, in which lignite was likely price-setting in the
German and Austrian wholesale market for electricity, was clearly below 10 percent
for the period covered in our sample. This finding is in stark contrast to the weight
of 39 percent that CO2 emissions of lignite currently have in the average emission
factor. Therefore, including total CO2 emissions from lignite in the calculation for
the current emission factors for indirect CO2 cost compensation clearly overstates
its actual impacts on the indirect CO2 costs in Central Western Europe.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 explains the concept
of marginality, outlines the empirical approaches to identify marginal plants, and
discusses their challenges. Section 3 and 4 present the analyses of both approaches
to identify marginal technologies in detail. Section 5 concludes.
2 Concept of marginality and empirical ap-
proaches
2.1 Motivation to study marginality of lignite power plants
Emissions from lignite fired power plants have a high weight in the emission factor
that is used to compensate industries for indirect CO2 costs. However, for the
German market, lignite plants are generally considered to serve base load, running
most of the time due to their low marginal costs. This means that the electricity
price level is no crucial determinant of the decision to produce power from lignite
once the investment costs are sunk. In return, one can assume that the marginal
costs of lignite plants, including marginal emission costs, are no crucial driver of
the electricity price level. Such reasoning would obviously fail (a.) due to enormous
3
Figure 1: The merit-order (stylised) as a concept for price formation in electricity
markets
increases in their marginal costs, e.g. when greenhouse gas emissions are priced
heavily, or (b.) when lignite plants are priced out of the market due to cheaper
rival technologies. The former scenario (a.) does not prevail in any jurisdiction
around the world yet. The latter scenario (b.), however, could be relevant in energy
systems with large renewable or nuclear capacities in the market or in connected
neighbouring markets. Both of the latter conditions apply for Germany.
2.2 The concept of marginality and the merit-order
‘Merit-order-pricing’ is a stylised model of price formation in electricity markets:
when power plants are ordered according to their marginal costs, the last plant that
is necessary to satisfy demand sets the price. But what price does the plant set?
One possible assumption would be that all plants are pricing at their own marginal
costs. An economically more plausible assumption is that the plant owner is pricing
just a tiny amount below the marginal cost of the closest competitor to keep the next
plant out of the market but still raising the own margin. Without more detailed
plant level information, but knowing that no generation technology is completely
monopolised within the German-Austrian market, we can assume that all plants of
the same technology compete with each other, and thus, it is the marginal cost of the
marginal technology which is setting the price. Indeed, most of the well-established
energy system models used in industry and for policy consulting are based on some
variant of such a merit order model. Figure 1 illustrates the concept.
2.3 Approaches to evaluate if a technology is price setting
Based on a simplified merit-order model and without detailed plant level data, we
consider two different approaches, one based on quantities, the other one on prices,
to identify time periods in which lignite plants can be expected to be price setting:
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1.) Marginality according to residual load: We identify hours in which total
electricity demand is such that it fulfils the following two criteria: a.) Load is so
high that it cannot be covered alone by production from technologies that rank
before lignite in the merit-order; b.) load is so low that no technology which is
more expensive than lignite is needed to satisfy total demand. In this approach,
we identify residual load for lignite after production from cheaper technologies is
subtracted and evaluate whether it falls within the range of available capacity for
lignite rather than exceeding it. Due to the varying nature of electricity demand,
this approach is most reasonably executed at the highest available frequency.
2.) Marginality according to marginal costs: We identify time periods, in
which electricity prices are above the marginal costs of the most efficient lignite
power plants, such that lignite plants are in the market, but below the marginal costs
of the closest more expensive competitor which in our case is the most efficient hard
coal fired power plants. Both technologies are subject to start-up and ramping costs
which render them inflexible to a certain degree with respect to high frequency price
changes. We therefore compare marginal costs to daily average prices, assuming that
plants are sufficiently flexible to react to price drops that extend over at least 24
hours. Moreover, note that the day-ahead auction takes place at noon the day before
delivery. A plant that would have to shut down or to start-up for the period of 24
hours would still have 12 hours to adjust before the beginning of the delivery period.
Taking daily average prices may thus help to overcome the potential bias introduced
by those inflexibilities.
Taking the two approaches in parallel and comparing the results helps us to control
for the drawbacks of either one. Our residual demand based approach requires
technology specific production data which is not available before July 2015. We
therefore restrict our analysis to the time period where a full data set is available.
2.4 Challenges of identification of the marginal technology
The following paragraphs address potential issues concerning the concept of
marginality and pricing behaviour of power plants, specifically deviations from
the merit-order due to inflexibilities, forward contracting and - capacities. These
aspects can be dealt with on one hand, by using additional market specific
information. On the other hand, and this approach applies more generally, we
believe that taking two different perspectives - one on prices, one on quantities) -
with possibly different frequencies of observation allows to account for deviations
in plant scheduling.
2.4.1 Deviations from the strict merit-order model
The merit-order model is economically and technologically intuitive, but a bit too
simplistic to fully capture the reality of production and pricing decisions in the mar-
kets. Plants might stay on the grid during hours where the price appears to be below
their (short run) marginal costs, or plants that could possibly produce profitably for
certain hours might stay out of the market for some unobserved reasons. The former
plants are often referred to as “must-run capacities” while the exact reason for why
they “must-run” is not evident. Possibilities are e.g. combined heat-power plants
that base their production decisions on the need for heat and dump the co-produced
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electricity on the market. Start-up and ramping costs are another possibility which
could convince a plant owner to stay online for certain hours at a loss to be able to
produce during other subsequent hours with a profit. A different possibility is the
fact that power can be traded in blocks of several hours, days or weeks. A producer
who is completely hedged against short time price changes might thus not react to
hourly prices when the effort for short term trading exceeds the expected benefit.
This latter form of inflexibility is sometimes referred to as ‘economic must-run’. Ev-
idently, all of these kinds of frictions or other market effects are blurring the picture
that one can obtain based on simple merit-order reasoning.
Aside of these hard to quantify technological and economic aspects, the merit-order
model relies on the assumption that firms base their decisions on marginal costs
alone, disregarding possibilities to exert market power and total cost recovery. That
said, merit-order pricing still is the dominating assumption underlying most energy
system models. Moreover, in the competitive market setting that we currently ob-
serve on the Central-European power markets, marginal cost based pricing appears
to be a reasonable assumption.
2.4.2 Start-up costs, block bids and economic must-run
An exact separation of ‘economic’ or ‘technological’ must-run is not possible. In the
end, every production decision is based on an economic decision subject to tech-
nologically determined constraints and costs. While the number and capacities of
combined-heat-power plants are known, there is no data on which of these plants
base their production decision on heat and which on power market related informa-
tion. The German Transmission System Operators (TSOs) commissioned a study
on the dimension of the capacity which can be expected to “must run” (Consentec
2016). The results give a first impression on the scale of the phenomenon.
Besides combined-heat-power, inflexibilities in adjusting electricity generation are
another highly relevant technological aspect of production which translates into
economic terms in form of start-up and ramping costs. The high costs to heat espe-
cially large power plants, such as lignite or nuclear plants, render a fast adjustment
of production to short lived price changes unattractive. The day-ahead market for
electric power at EPEXSpot accounts for such kind of frictions by allowing so-called
“block-bids”. While the standard traded unit in the day-ahead market is the de-
livery of electric power during a specific hour of the following day, block-bids allow
tying together several hour-contracts to larger blocks of hours. Common blocks are
“base load” or “peak load blocks” which capture all 24 hours, or all hours from 8
a.m. to 8 p.m. respectively. A selling bid for example is executed when the average
price for all covered hours is above the price limit of the seller. The seller has then
sold power for all hours of the block, although the price for power in some of these
hours might be below the variable production cost of the producing plant. For an
outsider, observing a plant producing at prices below its marginal costs therefore
apparently “must-run”, although it might go oﬄine when such low prices prevail for
a longer period.
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3 Analysis of marginality according to residual
load
3.1 The approach based on residual load calculation
In the first approach, we evaluate the relevance of lignite as a price setting technol-
ogy through the analysis of market data on load, generation, and available capacity.
The approach builds on market quantities rather than prices. The identification is
based on the merit-order model: Assuming a set of technologies with typically lower
marginal cost than lignite (e.g. hydro, nuclear, also called ‘inframarginal technolo-
gies’ in the following), we conclude that lignite is not price setting whenever the
observed output from these technologies alone suffices to serve overall demand. Lig-
nite would then be ‘out-of-the-market’. On the contrary, when total demand exceeds
the production from cheaper technologies, we know that the ‘residual load’ for lignite
power plants is just the difference of total demand and the production from these
cheaper technologies. We can then compare this residual demand to the available
capacity of lignite. If lignite capacities do not suffice to meet residual demand, we
know that more expensive technologies must kick-in and lignite will thus again not
be price setting. Classifying all observed time periods according to these possibili-
ties allows us to deduce those periods in which lignite is neither out-of-the-market,
nor insufficient to meet its residual demand. For these periods, lignite power plants
qualify to be at the margin, and thus price-setting.
3.2 Data sources on production, consumption, and capaci-
ties
3.2.1 Data on generation
We obtain hourly day-ahead planned generation for the German-Austrian bidding
zone from the EEX transparency platform for all available technologies, comprising
the following: biomass, coal, gas, pumped-storage, run-of-the-river, seasonal-store,
coal-derived-gas, garbage, lignite, oil, other, uranium, wind-offshore, wind-onshore.
Technology specific data for generation is available from 29 July 2015 onwards. The
last day in our sample is 28 July 2017, giving us exactly two years for the analysis.
So all seasons enter with equal frequency.
The implausibly low reported quantities on generation from wind and biomass in
this data set, and the missing information on solar requires us to use further data.
For wind and solar power, we use the hourly data on day-ahead predicted inflows
from the EEX transparency platform.
As there is no corresponding data on power production from biomass, we fol-
low Agora Energiewende in their approach to impute values as documented online
http://www.agora-energiewende.de/agorameter. Biomass is hereby assumed to en-
ter uniformly and at a stable rate. The production levels are imputed such that
they conform to the yearly reported overall production as well as to the intra-yearly
increases in installed capacity.
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3.2.2 Data on cross-border flows
We obtain scheduled cross-border flows for all interconnectors to/from the German-
Austrian bidding zone in hourly frequency from the ENTSO-E transparency plat-
form. We aggregate flows into net-flows such that negative flows indicate net im-
ports. Several interconnectors, especially smaller ones, lack data for significant time
windows. Corresponding flows are counted as “zero” when calculating total net
exports from the German-Austrian bidding zone to neighbouring countries. The
corresponding interconnectors are minor in terms of capacity and excluding all ob-
servations due to missing data on some interconnectors would mean to throw away
a lot of available information from the other interconnectors and the data sources.
Following this definition, we observe net cross-border flows from 29 July 2015 to 28
July 2017.
3.2.3 Data on demand
We obtain data on the total system load for the German-Austrian bidding zone from
the ENTSO-E transparency platform at hourly frequency. It is known from Hirth
and Schumacher (2015) that these load levels do not represent actual total electricity
consumption in precise quality due to several reporting problems, especially with
respect to self-consumption. However, these data are the only available in sufficiently
high frequency. Moreover, the ENTSO-E data is consistent with the other data we
use. We therefore rely on the ENTSO-E data, which also represents the industry
standard.
A total of 96 hours in our sample has missing values for predicted load. We replace
the corresponding missing entries with the realised load levels whenever the latter
are available.
3.2.4 Data on available capacity
We obtain information on available capacity from the EEX transparency platform
and screen all documented capacity reports for the last available date before actual
production. Thus, we typically capture the day-ahead reported availabilities.
Due to shortcomings of the EEX transparency platform when updating their server
in 2016, available capacity reports from the first semester of 2016 are completely
missing. Discarding the whole semester for the analysis would significantly reduce
our sample. As a means of interpolation, we alternatively use the median reported
available capacity within the time frame from 29 July 2015 and 28 July 2017 which
amounts to 17.686 GW. In other words, half of the daily reported values are above
this number, while the other half is below. Note that the distribution of records of
available capacity for lignite is left-skewed such that our median capacity is much
closer to the maximum observed available capacity of 20.044 GW rather than to the
minimum observed capacity (see Figure 2 below). Details and validity checks are
reported later in conjunction with the empirical analysis.
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3.2.5 Data on ‘must-run’ capacities
As explained before, the definition of must-run capacities is vague, and a clear
cut quantification is missing. The crucial characteristic of must-run capacities for
this analysis is that they are by definition not responding to electricity price level.
Technologies that are more expensive could thus alter the residual load for lignite.
Moreover, some parts of the lignite plants might also be ‘must-run’ capacities and
therefore would not bid according to marginal costs. We use the results of Consentec
(2016) as a measure of must-run capacities which are considered to be generating
independently of the price level. Averaging over the three different scenarios in
Consentec (2016) yields the following quantities for must-run capacities:
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Table 1: Must-Run Capacities based on Consentec, 2016
Fuel Type Capacity in MW
lignite 8526.3
uranium 6981.7
coal 2587.3
gas 1901.3
oil 62.0
garbage 148.3
run-of-the-river 118.3
pumped-storage 70.3
seasonal store 18.3
other 869.0
3.3 Results on marginality according to residual load
3.3.1 Marginality based on simple residual load
Taking all information together, we obtain the following data set with the corre-
sponding variables for our residual load calculation.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for data on quantities
Variable Min Median Max Observations Missing
predicted load 38131 62359 85600 17540 4
planned generation nuclear 2852 8174 9926 17542 2
planned generation garbage 8 136 222 17542 2
planned generation run-of-the-river 221 1690 4302 17542 2
predicted wind and solar 5891 17969 58090 17533 11
net exports -7065 4675 13744 17542 2
available lignite capacity 12852 17686 20044 13369 4175
inframarg 13284 27968 69423 17533 11
In total, we have 17,532 complete hourly observations, except for the available ca-
pacity of lignite. Residual load for lignite power plants is calculated as system load
minus the generation from technologies that are considered to run at lower marginal
costs (thus being inframarginal compared to lignite). We consider the following
technologies to fulfil this condition: uranium, run-of-the-river, garbage, wind, solar,
biomass.
To illustrate our approach consider Figure 3. It shows (from top to bottom) day-
ahead predicted load plus net export (black line), planned production from tech-
nologies that are considered to be inframarginal (shaded area in light blue), and the
reported available capacity of lignite (dark brown shaded area) over the course of our
sample period. Residual demand for lignite is therefore given by the lower border
of the light blue shaded area. The occurrences where residual demand dips into the
range of available capacity of lignite are those which can be considered to be hours
where lignite would be marginal (not yet accounting for must-run technologies). The
10
first half of 2016 shows the large gap in the time series of available capacities. For
not completely discarding this period, one has to assume some form of interpolation
for the available capacity of lignite. In our case, we chose the median value of those
values that we do observe, depicted by the dashed, red line below.
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Figure 3: Residual load and available capacity
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Evaluating our sample for the marginality of lignite, using the median available
capacity of lignite for interpolation, we obtain 541 hours out of 17,532 fulfilling the
marginality condition. This corresponds to 3.1 of all hours.
3.3.2 Sensitivity with respect to interpolation
The graphical presentation in Figure 3 indicates that the actual reported available
capacities do not vary much around the median and drop more prominently below,
rather than above. This suggests that the median could serve as a good proxy for
the missing data. To get a better understanding of how well the median proxies
actual available capacities in relation to residual load, we compare both methods
on the same reduced sample. Precisely, we calculate the ratio of marginal hours for
lignite solely based on the sample where we have actual reports and compare this
ratio with the ratio that one obtains, using only the median capacity on the same
sample. We find 2.8 percent of hours in which lignite is likely marginal using the
actual reports, compared to 3.2 when using the median of the available capacity as
a proxy. This suggests that our approach using the median rather overestimates
the number of hours where lignite is marginal compared to the actual reports. This
is not surprising in light of the skewed distribution of available capacity, showing
that the median is closer to the maximum rather than the minimum. Overall, both
numbers are still very close which makes us confident that the interpolation we used
before is a good approximation.
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3.3.3 Accounting for must-run capacities
The previous numbers do not take into account that several capacities might must
run. This applies both to e.g. hard coal or gas fired plants which would then be
placed in the merit-order before lignite plants, but it would also apply to parts of the
lignite plants. Plants that must run are by definition not reacting to price signals
and are therefore not price setting in the sense of marginal-cost-based pricing. As
discussed above, information on capacities that ‘must run’ and to what degree this
‘must’ applies is sparse. As an approximation, we are using the information from
Consentec (2016) to account for must-run capacities by technology. In the following,
we add must-run capacities for technologies which had not yet been declared to be
inframarginal (e.g. hard coal, gas, oil. . . ) to the block of inframarginal production.
On the other hand, we consider only those available capacities of lignite power plants
to be potentially price setting which exceed the capacities that are declared to ‘must
run’.
Figure 4 below depicts again predicted load plus net exports in black. But now,
we subtract the must-run capacities of more expensive technologies (coal, gas, etc.
in pink). Again, we moreover subtract the production from cheaper, inframarginal
technologies (nuclear, renewables in light blue) to obtain residual demand for lig-
nite (lower border of the light blue shaded area). Reported available capacities of
lignite are depicted in dark brown as before. We moreover account for the must-run
capacities of lignite which cannot be price setting. They are marked below in light
gray.
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Figure 4: Residual load, available capacity, and must−run capacities
M
W
load + net exports
reported capacity lignite
inframarginal production
median capacity lignite
mustrun other
mustrun lignite
For this modified setting, we find 1,344 hours fulfilling the marginality criterion based
on the interpolation of missing availability data with the median. This corresponds
to 7.7 percent of hours in our sample. When using only those hours for which
we have full capacity reports, we find 7 percent of hours fulfilling the marginality
criterion, while when we use the median as a proxy for available capacity over the
full sample, we find 8.3 percent. Again this points to our interpolation using the
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median is overstating rather than understating the importance of lignite as a price
setting technology.
3.3.4 Robustness check: maximum available capacity
This analysis takes different approaches to determine residual demand for lignite
plants and compares it to reported available capacities where possible. It moreover
uses an interpolation for periods where availably capacity reports are missing, and
checks the sensitivity of this approximation. The chosen method (taking the me-
dian) is found to exaggerate rather than underestimate the relevance of lignite as a
marginal technology. As another robustness check for this interpolation, we repeat
the analysis using the clearly exaggerating assumption that available capacity in
the time where reports are missing had been at the maximum value we observe in
our sample. Under this maximum assumption, we find 3.7 percent of our sample
to fulfil the marginality condition, not taking potential must-run capacities into ac-
count, and 9 percent when accounting for must-run capacities as detailed above.
Note that these values are still clearly below 10 percent, even though these values
are exaggerated due to the maximum assumption on available capacity.
4 Analysis of marginality according to marginal
costs
4.1 The approach based on marginal cost calculation
In the first approach, we have drawn conclusions on the relevance of lignite as a
price setting technology from data on demand, production, and capacity. Such a
quantity-based analysis evidently depends on a number of assumptions concerning
the merit-order and the price responsiveness of power plants. The second approach
takes a different perspective on the same question, drawing conclusions from realised
prices and production costs. Lignite power plants are considered to be price setting
when market conditions are such that lignite plants can recover their marginal costs
(meaning they are “in the money”) but more expensive competitors cannot (putting
the latter “out of the money”). We are thus interested in the price range that
spans between the marginal costs of lignite power plants and the closest marginal
competitor, usually hard coal fired plants. We then identify how often the observed
prices fall within this price range, suggesting that lignite plants have been price-
setting during the corresponding periods.
This approach does not depend on observed quantities or assumptions about must-
run capacities. Moreover, by looking at daily average prices it is possible to overcome
some of the previous assumptions. Consider for example block bids which have been
discussed in the introduction as a possibility to rationalise production of conventional
power plants in hours when prices are clearly below their marginal costs. In the
following, we consider day-ahead prices for the full block of 24 hours of the following
day. These blocks are traded one day ahead at noon, leaving 12 hours before delivery
begins. Thus, a conventional coal or lignite plant with limited flexibility can sell such
a block and still has half a day to ramp up, and no need to adjust production during
the day. The plant thus could be marginal for the whole day on average, although in
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the shorter run, we see price variations between different hours. Thus, we consider
this approach to be more robust with respect to the ramping and the specification
of must-run technologies. On the other hand, we have to rely on estimates for the
marginal costs of lignite and hard coal plants, based on the data we describe in the
following.
4.2 Data on prices and cost
4.2.1 Data on prices for electricity and emission allowances
We obtain hourly day ahead auction prices for the German-Austrian bidding zone
from EEX. The hourly prices are averaged on a daily basis which is equivalent to
the Physical Electricity Index Phelix. EU emission allowances prices are obtained
from the EUA spot market at EEX.
4.2.2 Data on the cost of power production from lignite
Lignite is hardly traded and usually produced close to the actual plant it fires. The
most recent study on the production cost of lignite is from Öko-Institut (2017). They
distinguish production costs of older and newer plants. As a lower bound for our
relevant price range, we are interested in the lowest marginal costs of lignite, which
are with the newer and more efficient plants. For newer lignite plants, Öko-Institut
(2017) esimates marginal fuel costs of 3.6 Euro per Megawatt hour (MMWh) electric
output and additional variable costs of 2 Euro per MWh electric output. The study
moreover reports specific CO2 emissions of 963 kilogram (kg) per MWh electric
output. Together with the EUA prices, we can approximate daily marginal costs for
the production of electric power from lignite by summing up fuel cost and emission
cost per MWh electric output.
4.2.3 Data on the cost of power production from hard coal
For the price of hard coal, we refer to the weekly McCloskey MCIS Marker coal
price index for North-West Europe. It is normalised to the price of hard coal with
a calorific value of 6000 kilocalories (kcal) per kg for delivery in the Amsterdam-
Rotterdam-Antwerp (ARA) region harbours. We translate the price into Euro val-
ues, using the European Central Banks (ECB) official USD/EUR daily exchange
rate. We moreover adjust the price per ton to represent the inner German 2015
average heat rate for hard coal of 6448 kcal/kg (Arbeitsgemeinschaft Energiebi-
lanzen 2017). To account for shipping costs from ARA to Germany, we add costs of
1.53 Euro per ton as suggested by BAFA (2016). Finally, we attribute the weekly
published price index to each following day after its publication until a new price
observation is available.
As we are interested in the closest competitor to lignite, we look for the lowest
marginal costs of a hard coal plant. We observe efficiency rates of 0.465 for the most
efficient German hard coal plant based on the data gathered by Open-Power-System-
Data.org. With respect to the CO2 content of the fuel, we refer to Juhrich (2016),
reporting 93.6 ton CO2 per Terajoule (TJ) thermal input for hard coal. From these
numbers, we can calculate fuel cost per MWh electric output for the most efficient
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hard coal plant. Together with the CO2 price data, we can moreover calculate the
emissions cost per MWh electric output. Finally, we are lacking precise estimates
on further marginal cost components such as wear-and-tear. As a proxy, we use the
same amount of 2 Euro per MWh electric output as for the lignite plants.
4.3 Results on marginality according to marginal costs
4.3.1 Marginality according to marginal costs
Figure 5 depicts the evolution of marginal costs for hard coal and lignite plants that
we calculate based on the efficiency levels, CO2 contents, input prices, and further
variable costs as detailed above.
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The range between the marginal costs of these two types of fuels (here shaded in light
brown) can be expected to be the price range in which lignite power plants are price
setting. The following graph (Figure 6) puts on a larger scale the daily average
power prices (physical electricity index, “Phelix”) in comparison to the marginal
costs.
It is evident that over the course of this period, power prices rarely fall into the
range which spans between the marginal costs of lignite and hard coal fired power
plants. This suggests that typically more expensive technologies than lignite are
price setting in the day ahead market.
However, in late 2016, we also observe power prices dipping below the marginal costs
of lignite, thus implying that coal and lignite plants would have been out of the
market altogether. Precisely, we find that power prices are in between the marginal
costs of lignite and hard coal for 38 days of our sample which covers 646 days in total.
In relative terms, the days where lignite would be potentially marginal correspond
to 5.9 percent of the total number of days within our observed time period.
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4.3.2 Robustness checks: fuel switch
Throughout this study, we have largely considered the merit-order to be stable
across generation technologies. In other words: while we did allow costs to fluctuate
for different fuels, we did not consider the case where marginal costs of different
technologies switch their order.
For the case of hard coal and lignite, we can see from the Figure 5 and 6 that such
a switch is clearly out of reach. Lignite fuel is produced at very low cost onsite. All
the dynamics we see in marginal costs for electricity production from lignite are due
to varying CO2 prices. Hard coal on the other hand is imported at world market
prices. Freight costs and emission costs apply on top. While lignite is slightly more
emission intensive than hard coal, higher CO2 prices still drive marginal costs for
both technologies. The relative difference in emission intensity is not as large as it is
between hard coal and gas. Thus, the leverage for CO2 prices is much smaller when
comparing hard coal with lignite. For a fuel switch to occur, one would need to
see drastically dropping prices for hard coal and/or drastically increasing prices for
emission allowances to compensate for the fuel price advantage that lignite currently
enjoys. Both does not seem likely yet. Let us consider what the implications would
be if any other fuels switched order:
Let us first consider the case of a fuel switch between lignite and cheaper technolo-
gies. Possible candidates are wind, solar, biomass, hydro, and nuclear. The marginal
costs of renewables can reasonably be considered to be zero. While this is not en-
tirely true for biomass, biomass capacities in Germany are remunerated through a
specific feed-in tariff, which puts them for the merit-order into the same category
as wind or solar. As lignite has evidently non-zero marginal costs, a fuel switch of
lignite and one of the renewable technology appears to be out of reach.
Nuclear, in contrast, has positive but small and rather stable fuel costs. A switch
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with lignite appears to be unlikely. But even if such a switch occured, what would be
the consequence? Consider the Figures 5 and 6 depicting the range of costs between
lignite and hard coal: In case some cheaper technology took the position of lignite,
this new fuel would become the new closest competitor. Thus, the cost range in
which lignite can be considered to be marginal would shrink.
Consider now the case of a fuel switch at the other end of the merit-order, e.g. be-
tween hard coal and natural gas. Such a change of relative position is not impossible
and has been witnessed in several markets before (e.g. in the USA in conjunction
with decreasing natural gas prices). Again, in Figures 5 and 6, if we had a fuel switch
at the upper end, there would be a new closest competitor upwards, e.g. natural gas
instead of hard coal, and the relevant cost range would become smaller. Thus, con-
sidering fuel switching would drive our results even further down, pointing to less
importance of lignite as a price setting technology.
In summary, the possibility of a fuel switch would rather decrease the likelihood of
lignite being marginal.
4.3.3 Robustness check: peak and off peak prices
The analysis of costs and prices has yet focused on daily average prices. This
allows overcoming the implausible assumption that lignite plants can adjust quickly
to hourly changes in the markets. In contrast, by bidding for complete days, the
marginal cost of lignite plants might have an important effect on the equilibrium
price for electricity. These daily averages obviously wash down price variation,
e.g. between night and day hours. One might thus wonder if evaluating complete
days could mask the marginality of lignite plants specifically during the off-peak
hours. Therefore, we split our hourly prices into blocks between 8 a.m. and 8 p.m.,
capturing prices during the day and between 8 p.m. and 8 a.m. for the night. For
not splitting two consecutive nights in half, we have shifted the last four hours of
each day to the next day. Thus, we calculate an average price per night, capturing
12 consecutive hours. Doing so, and comparing the corresponding prices with our
marginal cost range gives us 22 day-time averages as well as 73 nights where prices
are in that range. In total, this amounts to 7.4 percent of hours.
5 Conclusion and policy implications
We have presented two different approaches to evaluate the relevance of specific
power production technologies to be price setting. One approach solely focuses
on quantity data and takes a merit order of technologies as given. Comparing
the derived residual demand with available capacity provides an indicator for the
technology in question to be price-setting. No price or cost data is needed. The
other approach is independent of any quantity data by simply calculating minimal
marginal costs for competing technologies. Comparing the range between minimal
marginal costs of competing technologies with realised prices provides an alterna-
tive measure for the technology in question to be price-setting. Both approaches
are computationally simple and lightweight and use data which is usually available
for most power markets. Moreover, both approaches are based on a number of as-
sumptions that are frequently made in the study of power markets. But as both
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approaches vary in the assumptions they require and in the data they use, comparing
the obtained indicators from either approach can be informative.
We illustrate the implementation and the possibility to calculate variants and ro-
bustness checks at hand of lignite power in the German market. None of the variants
that we applied throughout this study suggests that lignite plants are price setting
for much more than 3 to 7 percent, and evidently less than 10 percent of all observed
periods in our sample, spanning from 29 July 2015 to 28 July 2017. This result con-
trasts with the average contribution of lignite power in the German-Austrian bidding
zone in which lignite plants had an average share of 39 percent in fossil fuel power
production over the years 2005 to 2015. Evidently, the share in production and
the relevance as a price setting technology of lignite clearly diverge. While this
insight might be trivial for experts, it is of a certain relevance for policies that are
implemented in a couple of EU member states. The European commission allows
to compensate electricity intensive sectors for incurred indirect CO2 costs that are
passed-on by power producers through electricity price. For the calculation of these
compensation, the commission uses emission intensities of power production that are
based on the average contribution of specific fuels to the mix of fossil fuel fired power
production. Here, lignite is found to be the most emission intensive technology but
to be inframarginal for most of the time.
Consequently, our analysis illustrates the potential fallacies that occur if policies
ignore the relevance of marginality in power generation. In the example of the EU
compensation scheme for indirect CO2 costs, our results suggest that the weight of
lignite in the specified regional emission factor is likely too high. On a broader scale,
our study suggests that alternative procedures for the parameterization of such poli-
cies are available and that these approaches can be implemented in a transparent and
computationally non-demanding manner. Based on a predefined set of assumptions
and data sources, these approaches could even be used for a dynamically updating
of policy parameters that depend on power prices and their constituents.
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